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barry goodwin@ncsu.edu.Policy Interactions at the Farm Level:
An Evaluation of Participation in the Conservation
Reserve Program and Related Policy Decisions
The U.S. federal government o®ers a very wide array of policy instruments intended to
address a number of perceived problems and issues in agriculture while, at the same time,
providing substantial support to agricultural producers. Individual policy instruments within
this array do not always operate in consistent ways. In particular, some policies may lead to
one e®ect while other policies have the opposite e®ect. A good example involves many of the
conservation programs. Policies such as the Conservation and Wetlands Reserve Programs
address conservation concerns by taking farm assets out of production while many other
programs tend to encourage production. This problem may be intensi¯ed in areas with
higher production and yield risk, since such higher risk is commonly believed to coincide
with more fragile production conditions. In particular, conventional wisdom maintains that
those areas with the highest production risk also tend to be the most susceptible to soil
erosion and land degradation.
The potential for such policy con°icts has not gone unnoticed in the empirical literature.
Goodwin and Smith (2003) considered the particular case of crop insurance, disaster relief,
and the conservation reserve program. They argued that crop insurance, disaster assistance,
and other production-oriented programs tended to encourage cultivation in areas sensitive to
soil erosion while the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) worked at opposite goals. How-
ever, their results tended to suggest that, although conventional price supporting programs
tended to have large production e®ects, crop insurance and disaster assistance had relatively
small direct impacts on soil erosion. Goodwin, Vandeveer and Deal (2004) considered the
acreage e®ects of crop insurance programs and found that the e®ects were very modest in
the Corn Belt but more moderate in the Upper Great Plains.
Existing work has largely focused on aggregate analysis-typically at the county level.
Important policy interactions may be di±cult to identify in such an analysis. In addition,
1the policy landscape has changed substantially in recent years. The 1996 and 2002 Farm
Bills brought about signi¯cant changes in policies, including production °exibility and a shift
toward conservation e®orts on working operations. In addition, the 2000 Agricultural Risk
Protection Act (ARPA) signi¯cantly expanded crop insurance o®erings. This paper utilizes
farm-level data from the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) project to con-
sider policy interactions at the farm level. We focus on the 2002-2005 period, during which
agriculture was governed by the terms of the 2002 legislation. We utilize farm-level data
over this period to jointly model production decisions (acreage and crop choice), conserva-
tion activities (conservation investments, land set-aside, and participation in conservation
programs), and participation in other programs including the federal crop insurance program.
These data are combined with county-level data on several important variables, including
yields and farm program payments, collected from NASS and the FSA.
The CRP program was established by the 1985 Food Security Act. Over its ¯rst few
years of existence, the CRP program removed about 34 million acres of \highly-erodible"
farmland from production. Eligibility for participation in the CRP program requires that
the land satisfy an \Environmental Bene¯ts Index" (EBI), which ranks land according to its
sensitivity to erosion as well as other environmental factors such as wildlife and air quality.
Enrollment has been limited to be no more than 25% of the total cropland in a given
county. Nationwide, about 240 million acres of cropland is eligible for participation in the
CRP. Enrollment has remained fairly constant at about 35 million acres since the program's
inception. However, the program has come under scrutiny in recent months as bio-energy
and ethanol incentives have raised questions about land retirement programs. Corn acreage
is predicted to rise by 12.1 million acres in 2007, exceeding 90 million acres nationwide. High
corn prices and the signi¯cant expansion in acreage has led many to question land retirement
programs. These issues will undoubtedly play an important role as the 2007 Farm Bill is
deliberated.1
The objective of this paper is to consider policy interactions at the farm level. In earlier
1CRP and corn acreage statistics taken from unpublished USDA data.
2research, Goodwin, Mishra and Kimhi (2006) considered the interactions of farm-level poli-
cies, farm structure, and the time allocations decisions of farm operators and their spouses.
As they note, existing theoretical and empirical research addressing the e®ects of farm policy
has largely focused on the farm business as the relevant unit of analysis rather than the farm
household. Indeed, this myopic view has characterized many dimensions of the farm policy
discussion. The decision-making framework may become much more complex and thus the
implications more clouded when one broadens the consideration of policy impacts to include
those impacts on the nonagricultural segments of the farm sector. It is, of course, the farm
household that is the relevant decision-making unit and thus considerations of the e®ects of
farm policies or other exogenous shocks must consider the household as a whole rather than
focusing only on the farm business. It is widely recognized that a substantial share (the
majority for most farms) of farm household income comes from o®-farm sources. O®-farm
labor earnings are an important component of the typical farm household's total income. To
the extent that wealth and income changes a®ect an individual's labor decisions, one avenue
by which direct wealth transfers, a common component of \decoupled" farm programs, may
in°uence agricultural production is through their e®ects on the allocation of time among
on-farm labor, o®-farm labor, and leisure. An understanding of farm household labor allo-
cation decisions is central to any consideration of the e®ects of farm policies on the overall
structure of the agricultural sector.
Goodwin et al. (2006) suggested important implications for the e®ects of farm policies on
the structure of farms. However, although their research identi¯ed an important mechanism
by which coupled and decoupled farm programs may a®ect output, they neglected to consider
one important dimension to U.S. farm policy|conservation programs. Rather than changing
the scale of a farming enterprise as a result of policy bene¯ts, farmers operating in today's
policy environment may instead choose to place their land in conservation reserve programs.
Our objective is to extend the earlier research of Goodwin et al. (2006) to include a
consideration of conservation reserve programs. We use a a multi-equation, semi-structural
model that includes farm structure equations, time allocation, and participation in the CRP
3program. Our overarching goal is to consider the extent to which participation in farm asset
retirement programs such as the CRP has e®ects on the time allocation decisions of farm
operators and their spouses. One might expect that farmers who place their land in the
CRP have more incentive to work o®-farm and, likewise, that farm operators who work o®
the farm are more likely to place their land in set-aside programs.
The U.S. Farm Policy Environment
The CRP program was established by the 1985 Farm Bill. As noted, the program has
removed approximately 34 million acres of U.S. farm land from production. Landowners
are given an annual rental payment in exchange for enrolling the land in the program. In
addition, other ¯nancial incentives, including cost sharing for conservation improvements,
are provided to landowners enrolling in the program. The program has undergone modest
changes in recent years but has survived through succeeding farm bills. Sullivan, Hellerstein,
Hansen, Johansson, Koenig, Lubowski, McBride, McGranahan, Roberts, Vogel and Bucholtz
(2004) point out that the CRP program may provide important incentives for farmers to leave
production agriculture and thus may have negative consequences for the ¯nancial wellbeing
of rural farm communities. In particular, they note that the CRP program may make it easier
for farmers to retire from farming and potentially to relocate to another area. This, in turn,
may lead to a drop in rural populations and a resulting loss of rural infrastructure, which
could lead to even greater migration away from farming communities. Figure 1 illustrates
CRP enrollment patterns for 2004|the most recent year for which data are available. Note
that participation appears to be concentrated in the Great Plains states.
As we have noted, other policy e®ects on the structure of farm households and rural
communities are possible. The provision of government support for removing assets from
production may be to encourage another form of migration o® the farm|a reallocation
of labor e®ort into o®-farm employment. This aspect of reallocating resources away from
farming may have very di®erent implications for rural communities. Rather than bringing
about an exodus of population, increased participation in o®-farm employment may actually
4bene¯t rural communities.
Other aspects of recent farm legislation also have important implications for the structure
of U.S. agriculture. Several speci¯c provisions of the 1996 FAIR Act brought about signif-
icant changes in U.S. agricultural policy. Perhaps the most signi¯cant change involved the
elimination of production constraints (and acreage base requirements) and the concomitant
movement toward direct support that was not tied (or \coupled") to production decisions.
In theory, such decoupled support was believed to be less distorting to markets in that there
was no production requirement to be eligible for the payments. The intended \transition to
the market" was re°ected in a series of direct payments, which were based upon historical
production and were not tied to market conditions or current production. In a manner that
re°ected their supposed role in policy reform, these payments were referred to as \Agricul-
tural Market Transition Act" or AMTA payments. A schedule of payments was established
for each program crop and the payment rates were set to decline each year through the end
of the legislation in 2002.
A full appreciation of the policy environment of the time as well as that which followed
requires consideration of the general state of agricultural markets and the U.S. agricultural
economy as the FAIR Act was being deliberated and implemented. Figure 1 illustrates the
development of real ($2005 terms) net farm income less total direct government payments|a
measure of net returns from the market (with an adjustment having been made for govern-
ment payment receipts).2 Note that, in the early 1990s, despite a degree of year-to-year
volatility, net income remained strong and robust. Figure 1 also presents total direct gov-
ernment payments as a proportion of net farm income from the market. The diagram also
illustrates the fact that government payments, as a percentage of total farm income, remained
relatively low in the years leading up to the 1996 FAIR Act.
Several events in the latter half of the decade brought about some rather signi¯cant
changes in the views of U.S. agricultural policymakers. Demand for U.S. agricultural ex-
ports fell signi¯cantly over the latter part of the decade, due in part to the Asian ¯nancial
2The statistics presented in Figure 1 were taken from the Economic Report of the President, 2006.
5crisis and relatively strong growing conditions elsewhere in the world. The U.S. agricultural
trade balance fell from $26.8 billion in 1996 to only $10.7 billion in 1999.3 This general
collapse of agricultural markets and overall malaise in the U.S. agricultural economy made
the reform rhetoric of just a few years previous much less palatable to U.S. policymakers.
Congress quickly retreated from the market reforms implied by the 1996 legislation and in-
stituted a number of ad-hoc measures intended to direct funds to U.S. farmers. Much of
this support was conveyed through \market loss assistance" payments, which were ad-hoc,
direct payments made to producers as compensation for the ¯nancial losses brought about
by weak markets. Figure 1 illustrates the substantial increases in government support for
U.S. farmers in the latter part of the 1990s. Between 1997 and 1999, the ratio of payments to
net market income rose from under 0.10 to over 0.45. Some debate ensued as to the extent to
which these ad-hoc payments were decoupled. Market loss assistance payments were based
upon the decoupled market transition payments and thus did not require current production
in order to be eligible. However, the payments were deemed to have been triggered by low
market prices and thus, under the terms of the Uruguay Round WTO Agreement, were
considered to be tied to markets and thus \amber-box" support.
The extent to which the FAIR Act actually constituted a change in U.S. farm policy
became especially questionable with the implementation of the 2002 Farm Bill. The 2002
Farm Bill, which was signed into law on May 13, 2002, provided generous increases in
support and extended the ¯xed, decoupled AMTA-type payments for another six years.
Not only were the payments extended under the 2002 Act, producers were also given the
opportunity to update their base acreage and yields which determine the payments and,
perhaps more important, to include historical soybean acreage in their base. Provisions for
updating this historical base led many to question the extent to which ¯xed, direct payments
are actually decoupled. In the end, the 2002 Farm Bill provided generous support, which
was scored by the Congressional Budget O±ce at over $190 billion for the ten-year period
which follows the Act. The 2002 Act, which currently governs U.S. farm policies, provided
3Unpublished data taken from USDA sources.
6three primary mechanisms for support|¯xed, direct (decoupled) payments; counter-cyclical
payments (which are largely analogous to the ad-hoc market loss assistance payments which
preceded the 2002 Act); and loan-de¯ciency (coupled) payments, which are paid on a per-unit
basis and thus are directly tied to production.
Time Allocation and Farm Structure: Conceptual Issues
An extensive literature has addressed issues pertaining to the time allocation decisions of
farm households. This line of research has taken on new importance in recent years in
light of an increasing focus on the economic status of the entire farm household and the
ever-increasing dependence of farm households on non-farm employment opportunities. The
general line of enquiry undertaken in these studies parallels that which characterizes the
wide body of research evaluating the determinants of labor supply. Individuals choose to
allocate their time among competing work and leisure activities according to the relative
returns o®ered by each activity. These returns, in turn, are determined by an individual's
talents and abilities, preferences, wealth, risk attitudes, and other factors pertinent to utility
maximization choices. Of course, when one considers choices among multiple job opportu-
nities, more time spent in one activity usually implies less time available for others. In the
case of agricultural households, more time spent working o® the farm or in consuming leisure
generally will imply that less time will be spent in farming.
This shift in time (and potentially other) resources away from farming may have impor-
tant implications for structural aspects of any individual farm. For example, the gradual
shift in population and labor out of the farm sector has corresponded to a concomitant
increase in average farm sizes and greater specialization in farm enterprises.
A number of studies have considered the relationship of individual farm and operator
factors to the allocation of time by farm households. Schultz (1990) noted that o®-farm
employment was an important mechanism by which farm households could diversify their
income. Mishra and Goodwin (1994) con¯rmed this role and found that farmers with sig-
7ni¯cant farm income risk were more likely to pursue o®-farm employment opportunities.
A number of studies have considered various demographic factors that are relevant to the
time allocation decisions of farm operators and their spouses. Factors such as age, farm and
non-farm work experience, education, and household size have been found to be signi¯cantly
related to the extent of o®-farm work (see, for example, Mishra and Goodwin (1997), Good-
win and Mishra (2004), Kimhi (1996), Goodwin and Holt (2002), Furtan (1985), Hu®man
and Lange (1989), Lass and Gempesaw (1992), and Sumner (1982)). In addition, a number
of farm characteristics have been demonstrated to be signi¯cantly related to o®-farm work
decisions. Factors such as farm size, tenancy, enterprise choice, diversi¯cation, and ¯nancial
leverage have all been found to be related to time allocations decisions.
The potential for farm structure and other characteristics of farming operations to be en-
dogenous to o®-farm labor decisions has received considerably less attention in the empirical
literature. Goodwin and Mishra (2004) considered the possibility that farming \e±ciency"
could be endogenous to the o®-farm labor choice. Although they acknowledged the di±cul-
ties associated with measuring farming e±ciency, they found that farms with operators that
tended to devote considerable time to o®-farm work also tended to be \less-e±cient," where
e±ciency was measured using a ratio of revenues to costs. Ahituv and Kimhi (2006) found
that farm activity and non-farm work e®ort were jointly determined and that farmers that
had increased the scale of their operation have tended to work less of the farm. In contrast,
farms that had downsized the scale of their farm operation had tended to work more o®
the farm. Ahituv and Kimhi (2002) found that the capital holdings of farmers tended to
be endogenous to their o®-farm work decisions. McNamara and Weiss (2005) found that
farm enterprise diversi¯cation and the diversi¯cation of on-farm and o®-farm earnings for
a sample of Austrian farmers tended to be a®ected by the same general household, farm,
and operator characteristics. This implies that the diversi¯cation of a farm could be jointly
determined with labor allocation decisions. Fernandez-Cornejo, Gempesaw, Elterich and
Stefanou (1992) investigated scope and scale economies for a sample of German dairy farms
and found that the scale of land and other inputs tended to be important determinants
8of economies of scale and scope. Their analysis, however, stopped short of considering the
relationship of scale and scope with time and labor allocation decisions.
Empirical Analysis and Results
Our analysis is conducted using individual farm data collected under the Agricultural Re-
source Management Survey (ARMS) project by the National Agricultural Statistics Service
of the USDA. The ARMS data are collected annually by means of a survey of individual
farmers. The ARMS data represent the USDA's primary source of information about U.S.
agricultural production conditions, marketing practices, resource use, and economic well-
being of farm households. We focus on data taken from 2003 and 2004. These two years
were characterized by a common policy environment|the 2002 Farm Bill. In addition, the
ARMS surveys collected detailed data regarding o®-farm employment by farmers and their
spouses, as well as many operator characteristics conceptually related to o®-farm work. Al-
though the ARMS data provide a rich and valuable set of detailed farm household data, the
database does have an important limitation|the lack of repeated sampling on individual
farms. That is, the sample is taken randomly each year and it is thus impossible to observe
the same farm in more than a single year. This implies an important reliance on cross-
sectional variability and prevents one from conditioning observed events on the preceding
year's experience or on ¯xed farm e®ects. In addition, identi¯cation issues may be compli-
cated by an inability to condition on variables that are clearly predetermined (i.e., observed
in previous time periods).
A variety of other sources were used to collect data pertinent to farm structure and
labor market conditions. County-level unemployment rates were collected from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS). Opportunities for o®-farm employment will be re°ected in this
measure of local labor market conditions. We collected annual, county-level measures of total
farm sales (cash receipts from marketings) and total production expenses from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) Regional Economic Information System (REIS). From these data,
9we calculated implied market rates of return to farming (measured as the log of the ratio
of the sum of gross sales to the sum of total costs) for the period covering 1990-2002. We
also calculated the standard deviation of this measure of farming returns over the 1970-2002
period to represent the inherent volatility (and riskiness) of agriculture in the county.
A key focus of our analysis involves the role of government policy on farm structure
and o®-farm labor supplies. We collected farm program payment data for each county
from unpublished Farm Service Agency (FSA) sources for the period covering 1990-2002.
We grouped the payment data into three aggregated categories|coupled payments, direct
(decoupled) payments, and all other payments. Table 1 presents a listing of the speci¯c
programs and our categorization. In general, coupled payments included de¯ciency and loan
de¯ciency payments and marketing loan gains. Direct payments included AMTA payments,
direct payments, and ad-hoc market loss assistance payments|all of which have no direct
production requirements for eligibility. Finally, all other farm program payments including
disaster relief were grouped in a residual category. It is important to acknowledge that
payments made under some programs may be di±cult to classify. For example, market loss
assistance and counter-cyclical payments are decoupled in that they do not have production
requirements but are of a coupled nature in that they are triggered by low market prices.
Our intent is to capture payment expectations|which should be the primary factor
in°uencing producer decisions. In that realized farm program payments vary substantially
from year-to-year, receipts in any single year may not be representative of the expected
value of payments. We sum payment receipts in each category over the 1990-2002 period
and then use farm acreage for the county reported in the 2002 Agricultural Census to place
the payments on a per-acre basis. CRP rental payments and incentives were placed on a
per-CRP-acre basis by dividing through by the 2005 enrollment statistics collected from the
FSA.
We used the 1997 and 2002 Agricultural Census data to construct a number of county-
level measures representing the aggregate structure of the agricultural sector in each county.
This included shares of the total value of production for various product groups, the scale of
10agriculture (in terms of the total value of sales) in the county, and changes in the structure
of agriculture in the county from 1997 to 2002. All ¯nancial values are converted to real
terms by dividing by the consumer price index.
A number of important econometric issues underlie our empirical analysis. An important
characteristic of the ARMS data relates to the strati¯ed nature of the sampling used to
collect the data. Two estimation approaches have been suggested for problems such as this
involving strati¯cation. The simplest involves a jacknife procedure, where the estimation
data are split into a ¯xed number of subsamples and the estimation is repeated with each
subsample omitted. An alternative approach involves repeated sampling from the estimation
data in a bootstrapping scheme. Ideally, rather than random sampling from the entire
estimation sample, an appropriate approach to obtaining unbiased and e±cient estimation
results involves random sampling from individual strata (see, for example, Deaton (1997)). In
the ARMS data, however, this is not possible since the strata are not identi¯ed. The database
does, however, contain a population weighting factor, representing the number of farms in the
population (i.e., all U.S. farms) represented by each individual observation. This can be used
in a probability-weighted sampling scheme whereby the likelihood of being selected in any
given replication is proportional to the number of observations in the population represented
by each individual ARMS observation. We utilize a probability-weighted bootstrapping
procedure.
The speci¯c estimation approach involves selecting N observations (where N is the size of
the survey sample) from the sample data. The data are sampled with replacement according
to the probability rule described above.4 The models are estimated using the pseudo sample
of data. This process is repeated a large number of times and estimates of the parameters
and their variances are given by the mean and variance of the replicated estimates.5
4To be precise, if observation i represents ni farms out of the total of M farms in the population, the
likelihood that observation i is drawn on any given draw is ni=M. It should be acknowledged that our
approach may result in less e±cient estimates than would be the case were sampling from individual strata
possible. This could occur in cases where inferences are being made about variables used in designing the
strati¯cation scheme in that such information is being ignored by not drawing from individual strata. To
the extent that this is relevant to our analysis, the t-ratios reported below represent conservative estimates.
5We utilize 1,000 replications in the applications which follow.
11An important econometric issue also involves the fact that a censoring issue underlies
several of the individual equations to be estimated in our analysis. In particular, our measure
of farm scope|an index of diversi¯cation|is censored at zero for single-enterprise farms. In
addition, CRP participation is censored for zero for farms that do not participate and o®-farm
labor supply is censored at zero for individuals who do not work o® the farm. Procedures
for estimating simultaneous equation models with censored endogenous variables have been
proposed by Amemiya (1979), Nelson and Olson (1978), Lee, Maddala and Trost (1980),
Newey (1987), and Vella (1993). Nelson and Olson (1978) suggested a simple two-stage
procedure where the endogenous right-hand side variables are replaced by the X¯ index
implied by standard maximum likelihood Tobit estimates of a ¯rst-stage regression of the
censored variable on an instrument set. However, Nelson and Olson's estimator understates
the true variance associated with the second-stage parameter estimates in that it ignores
the uncertainty associated with estimation of the ¯rst-stage. Maddala (1983) notes that
an analytical solution for the exact covariance matrices of the second stage estimates may
be very complex. We instead utilize our probability-weighted bootstrapping procedures to
derive covariance estimates of the second stage parameter estimates.
Our speci¯c empirical analysis consists of a four-equation simultaneous equations system.
The ¯rst two equations represent o®-farm labor participation decisions for farm operators
and their spouses. Note that our analysis was limited to only those farm households with
both an operator and a spouse. We hypothesize that o®-farm labor supply is related to
education, age, farming experience, local labor market conditions (unemployment), the mean
and standard deviation of returns to agricultural production, household size, farm program
payments, and the size and scope of the agricultural operation.6 Size and scope are the
structural variables which we allow to be endogenous to one another and to o®-farm labor
supplies. We also allow the farm operator's o®-farm labor supply to be endogenous to the
spouse's labor decisions and vice versa. We measure the overall scope of a farming operation
in terms of its diversi¯cation across alternative crop and livestock enterprises. In particular,
6Note that the reporting of age for spouses was incomplete and thus we use the operator's age in both
the operator and spouse equations.
12we adopt a Her¯ndahl-based index of diversi¯cation, given by






where wij is the share of the total value of output accounted for by enterprise j on farm
i. For a farm of a single enterprise, Hi will be zero. However, Hi approaches one for very
diversi¯ed farms. Note that this measure of scope is censored from below at zero and thus
also requires estimators that recognize such censoring. We assume that farm scope for an
individual farm will re°ect government program payments at the county level, a measure
of the overall diversi¯cation of agriculture in the county (which represents environmental
and local market conditions that in°uence the potential and pro¯tability of diversi¯cation
on a farm), and the overall production patterns (represented by shares of production value
accounted for by certain commodity categories at the county level).
As a measure of farm scale, we utilize the total acres operated on the farm. We are
assuming that total land holdings will be adjusted in response to changes in the relative
returns to alternative agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises. In light of the substantial
prevalence of rental arrangements in U.S. agriculture, farm size is likely to be frequently
adjusted in response to changes in policies and other exogenous factors.7 It is also possible
however, that total farm size is relatively ¯xed in the short-run and that farm owners and
operators may choose simply to idle land and other resources. In addition, the ARMS survey
considers land that is enrolled in conservation set-aside programs and land that is otherwise
idled to still be part of a farm operation. Finally, acreage operated may not be an ideal
measure of the overall scale of a farm operation for some farms|especially in the case of
livestock operations, which utilize land resources in ways that di®er from crop farms.
As an alternative, we also consider a second analysis that is limited only to crop farms.
Farms are classi¯ed according to the value of their production as being primarily crop or
livestock operations. Of our sample of 12,935 farms, 6,809 were de¯ned as crop farms. We
utilized the number of crop acres harvested in each year as a second measure of scale. This
7The 2002 Agricultural Economics and Land Owners Survey determined that approximately 45% of U.S.
farmland is operated by a tenant.
13provides a more direct representation of the short-run scale of an individual operation. In
addition, whereas holdings of farm acreage may be relatively hard to adjust in the short-
run, crop acreage can be easily idled in response to market conditions, policies, or non-farm
alternatives. We assume that farm scale is in°uenced by factors pertinent to the pro¯tability
of agriculture in the county (both mean and standard deviation), the average scale of farms
in the county, output per acre in the county, farm program payments, farm diversi¯cation,
and o®-farm labor market participation by operators and their spouses.
Results
Table 2 presents variable de¯nitions and summary statistics for the complete sample, which
consists of 2,778 farm households consisting of a farm operator and a spouse. The sample
was selected from the wider ARMS sample on the basis of the completeness of survey re-
sponses. In particular, a limiting factor for many surveys involved incomplete responses for
characteristics of the spouse. We limited our sample to crop farms and dropped any farms
in counties for which the implied CRP payments per acre exceeded $1,000 in 2004. The
average farm in our sample consists of 1,264 acres and the average operator was 53 years of
age, with 24 years of farming experience, and came from a household with 3 family members.
Farm operators worked an average of about 519 hours per year while the spouses worked an
average of about 1,025 hours in o®-farm employment activities over a year.
Table 2 presents bootstrapped parameter estimates and summary statistics for the CRP
acreage enrollment equation. Only about 17.7% of the farms enrolled to some extent in the
CRP program. The results indicate that larger farms are more likely to enroll in the CRP
program. This re°ects a scale e®ect (larger farms necessarily have more acres). Surprisingly,
there does not appear to be any statistically signi¯cant relationship between o®-farm work
by operators and their spouses and enrollment in the CRP program. In both cases, hours
worked do not have a signi¯cant e®ect on acres enrolled in the CRP program. We do ¯nd
that the share of farm sales accounted for by livestock commodities (in the 2002 Agricultural
Census) do tend to correspond to more enrollment in the CRP. Livestock operations are
14more highly concentrated in less productive crop regions and thus this likely re°ects the
lower productivity of land on such operations. As expected, a positive relationship exists
with respect to CRP incentives and payments|higher payments trigger greater incentives
to enroll.
Table 3 presents bootstrapped parameter estimates and summary statistics for the o®-
farm labor supply equations for farm operators and spouses taken from all farm types and
the entire sample. In most cases, the estimates are highly signi¯cant and conform to expec-
tations. In both the operator and spouse cases, o®-farm work by one individual tends to be
correlated with an increased o®-farm work e®ort by the other individual. This is consistent
with expectations in that spouses tend to share similar attitudes, opportunities, and con-
straints regarding o®-farm employment. Participation in o®-farm labor markets appears to
diminish signi¯cantly with age, especially in the case of farm operators. O®-farm work is
positively related to education, re°ecting the improved opportunities and higher wages avail-
able to individuals with more education. The education variables, which represent di®erent
categories of increasing levels of education, show that o®-farm work rises with each level
of education, with the highest levels of participation being realized for farm operators and
spouses with graduate degrees. The e®ect of education appears to be substantially stronger
for spouses than is the case for farm operators in that the education coe±cients are sub-
stantially larger.8 The unemployment rate in the county has a negative e®ect on the degree
of participation in o®-farm labor markets by spouses, though it narrowly misses being sta-
tistically signi¯cant. In contrast, farm operators' o®-farm work e®orts are not signi¯cantly
a®ected by the county-level unemployment rate. This suggests that spouses' labor supply
may be more volatile in response to the diminished work opportunities implied by higher
rates of unemployment. Spouses from larger households are less likely to work o® the farm,
a result that likely re°ects the child care obligations that typically are more substantial in
larger farm households. Household size does not appear to have a signi¯cant impact on farm
8Note that an adequate approximation for marginal e®ects at the mean values of the data in a Tobit model
can be derived by scaling the parameter estimates by the proportion of noncensored values in the data|0.54
for operators and 0.60 for spouses. The similarity of these proportions suggests that direct comparisons of
the coe±cients across the equations will not be misleading.
15operators' participation in o®-farm labor markets. More farming experience, a factor that
would be expected to be correlated with returns to farming, is associated with less work o®
the farm.
The results reveal several interesting ¯ndings in relation to the e®ects of agricultural
market conditions on labor supply. A higher rate of return to farming appears to signi¯cantly
diminish farm operators' participation in o®-farm labor markets|a ¯nding consistent with
the fact that such a condition raises the relative returns to on-farm work. In contrast,
spouses' o®-farm work decisions do not appear to be signi¯cantly a®ected by the average
rates of return to agricultural activities. Perhaps of greatest interest are the e®ects of farm
program payments on the labor allocation decisions of farm households. In the case of farm
operators, o®-farm labor is only a®ected by the \all other payments" category. In that
case, more payments are correlated with less o®-farm work. In the case of spouses, more
coupled payments tend to lead to more o®-farm work while more direct, decoupled payments
tend to be associated with less o®-farm employment. The wealth transfers implied by direct
payments may lead to a diminished work e®ort and the consumption of more leisure. At ¯rst
glance, the positive relationship between coupled payments and the o®-farm labor supply of
spouses is harder to explain. However, it is important to recognize that we are conditioning
o®-farm labor supplies on our farm structure variables which represent size and scope. We
expect that increased coupled payments will increase farm size (discussed below) and thus
potentially decrease o®-farm labor supplies (as more labor is directed to the farm). This
additional e®ect on o®-farm labor supplies may represent increased specialization within the
household, as spouses allocate more e®ort o® the farm.
The results also reveal interesting results for the e®ects of farm structure on o®-farm labor
e®orts. In the case of the farm operator, larger farms tend to lower the extent of participation
in o®-farm labor markets. This is not surprising in that the labor demands associated with
farms of increased size and scope should result in an allocation of the farm operator's labor
away from o®-farm work. In the case of spouses' o®-farm work, farm size does not have a
signi¯cant in°uence on the work decision. In contrast, increased diversi¯cation tends to be
16associated with more work o® the farm by spouses. This may re°ect the fact that o®-farm
work by spouses is an additional diversi¯cation measure that may be undertaken, along with
diversi¯cation of the farm enterprise, to better manage farm risk. Thus, it is not surprising to
¯nd such diversi¯cation through participation in o®-farm labor markets occurring on farms
that are also highly diversi¯ed in terms of farm output.
Table 4 presents bootstrapped parameter estimates and summary statistics for our two
farm structure measures|size (acres operated) and scope (diversi¯cation). In the case of
farm size, we ¯nd reinforcement for the relationship between labor allocation and scale in
the o®-farm labor supply equations. More acreage tends to be operated for farms having
operators that do not work o® the farm but spouses that do participate in non-farm labor
markets. Farm program payments also tend to have important impacts on farm structure.
Direct payments tend to be associated with less acreage being operated. This may re°ect the
presence of important wealth e®ects, implying that less e®ort is directed to farm labor (and
thus farm scale) as more leisure is consumed. As expected, coupled payments are correlated
with larger farms. Payments tied directly to production raise farm returns and thus would be
expected to lead to larger farms. Other types of farm program payments, largely representing
disaster relief, are correlated with larger farms. More highly diversi¯ed farms tend to be
larger, possibly re°ecting greater land demands associated with diversi¯ed production. Table
4 also contains parameter estimates for the farm diversi¯cation equation. In this application,
farm diversi¯cation only appears to be responsive to variables representing the composition
of the county in terms of crops produced and changes over time.
In short, the results demonstrate that there are important interrelationships among farm
structure, farm program participation, farm households' time allocation decisions, and farm
payments. Direct farm payments tend to be associated with less o®-farm work and less
acreage in production. This may suggest that, in contrast to arguments in favor of substantial
production e®ects, decoupled farm program payments tend to be associated with a smaller
work e®ort both on the farm and in o®-farm markets. This may re°ect a wealth e®ect
that corresponds to an increased consumption of leisure in response to policy-driven wealth
17transfers. Coupled payments directly in°uence the returns to farming and thus are expected
to be positively correlated with the size of farms and negatively correlated with o®-farm labor
supplies|at least for farm operators. Our results are consistent with these expectations and
also suggest that payments tied to production are correlated with larger, more specialized
farms. We do not ¯nd important linkages between o®-farm work and participation in the
CRP program|the evaluation of which was a major objective of this research. The topic
certainly merits additional consideration and evaluation.
Concluding Remarks
Our analysis has considered relationships among CRP enrollment, time allocation for farm
operators and their spouses and endogenous farm structure. We considered two aspects of
farm structure|farm scale and farm scope. In the case of scale, we consider two alternative
measures. The ¯rst considers total acreage under operation for all farm types while the
second focuses on harvested acreage for crop farms. Several important conclusions emerge
from our analysis.
Our results do not suggest a statistically signi¯cant link between land set-asides occurring
as a result of participation in the CRP program and time allocation decisions. We do ¯nd
that other aspects of farm structure and household time allocations are signi¯cantly related
to one another. In general, operators on larger and more diversi¯ed farms tend to work less
o® the farm. Size may be endogenous to o®-farm work decisions in that farms tend to also
be smaller when farmers pursue o®-farm work opportunities. The converse is true for the
operators' spouses. Farms with spouses that spend considerable e®ort working o® the farm
tend to actually be of a larger scale.
Perhaps of greatest signi¯cance are our results linking policy expectations (measured
through long-run averages of payments at the county level) with farm structure and time
allocation. Direct (decoupled) payments tend to be associated with less o®-farm work by
spouses, a smaller scale of production, and more diversi¯cation. This result has relevance to
18the ongoing debate over the production neutrality of decoupled payments. Coupled payments
tend to be associated with more o®-farm work by spouses and larger farms, thus suggesting



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21Table 2. CRP Program Participation Tobit Equation Estimates
Parameter Standard t
Variable Estimate Error Ratioa
Intercept ¡732:5754 154:5745 ¡4:74¤
Acres Operated 247:9670 85:1239 2:91¤
Operator Hours ¡4:7532 3:5622 ¡1:33
Spouse Hours ¡0:3338 4:6324 ¡0:07
County Share of Livestock 108:8967 59:2133 1:84¤
County CRP Acres Enrolled 0:2531 0:1362 1:86¤
CRP Payments 13:9009 6:9458 2:00¤
County Average Output per Acre ¡14:9292 51:1449 ¡0:29
¾ 415:7484 80:6776 5:15¤
aAn \*" indicates statistical signi¯cance at the ® = :10 or smaller level.
22Table 3. O®-Farm Labor Supply Tobit Equation Estimates
Parameter Standard t
Variable Estimate Error Ratioa
....................................Farm Operator ....................................
Intercept 3:3156 8:8678 0:37
Spouse Hours 0:4930 0:1187 4:15¤
Age 0:6497 0:3291 1:97¤
Age2 ¡0:0086 0:0034 ¡2:55¤
Education2 0:8465 1:6883 0:50
Education3 ¡3:0712 1:9238 ¡1:60
Education4 0:8738 1:8524 0:47
Education5 2:0481 2:0553 1:00
Acres Operated ¡4:0991 2:0238 ¡2:03¤
Farming Experience ¡0:2247 0:0673 ¡3:34¤
Farm Scope 5:6274 4:1657 1:35
Unemployment Rate 0:0075 0:2960 0:03
Mean Market Returns ¡8:2463 3:5665 ¡2:31¤
Std. Deviation Market Returns ¡10:5979 8:7160 ¡1:22
Direct Payments ¡0:0114 0:0238 ¡0:48
Coupled Payments ¡0:0093 0:0208 ¡0:45
All Other Payments ¡0:0250 0:0119 ¡2:10¤
Household Size 0:3976 0:3374 1:18
CRP Acres Enrolled 0:0023 0:0028 0:84
¾ 16:1961 0:3233 50:10¤
........................................Spouse ........................................
Intercept ¡11:8836 8:0207 ¡1:48
Operator Hours 0:3290 0:0764 4:31¤
Age 0:8531 0:2370 3:60¤
Age2 ¡0:0101 0:0024 ¡4:20¤
Education2 2:7684 1:7083 1:62
Education3 7:4952 1:7522 4:28¤
Education4 8:4386 1:8351 4:60¤
Education5 9:2298 1:8598 4:96¤
Acres Operated 1:4451 1:2516 1:15
Farming Experience ¡0:0293 0:0246 ¡1:19
Farm Scope 4:5118 2:3079 1:95¤
Unemployment Rate ¡0:3115 0:2085 ¡1:49
Mean Market Returns ¡1:4638 2:5409 ¡0:58
Std. Deviation Market Returns 5:3684 5:7841 0:93
Direct Payments ¡0:0375 0:0193 ¡1:94¤
Coupled Payments 0:0266 0:0159 1:68¤
All Other Payments 0:0038 0:0100 0:38
Household Size ¡0:5833 0:2929 ¡1:99¤
CRP Acres Enrolled ¡0:0003 0:0022 ¡0:15
¾ 12:9812 0:2317 56:02¤
aAn \*" indicates statistical signi¯cance at the ® = :10 or smaller level.
23Table 4. Farm Structure Equation Estimates
Parameter Standard t
Variable Estimate Error Ratioa
...................................... Farm Size ......................................
Intercept 0:0037 0:1623 0:02
Mean Market Returns 0:5158 0:3269 1:58
Std. Deviation Market Returns 1:9914 0:7689 2:59¤
Farm Scope 0:3422 0:1088 3:14¤
Direct Payments ¡0:0025 0:0010 ¡2:65¤
Coupled Payments 0:0014 0:0007 1:92¤
All Other Payments 0:0016 0:0005 2:91¤
Operator Hours ¡0:0139 0:0059 ¡2:37¤
Spouse Hours 0:0213 0:0070 3:07¤
County Average Output per Farm 0:0272 0:0077 3:55¤
Change in Output per Farm 0:0812 0:1401 0:58
Total County Output Value 2002 ¡0:4098 0:3402 ¡1:20
County Average Output per Acre ¡0:5188 0:1008 ¡5:15¤
County Share of Livestock ¡0:0845 0:1284 ¡0:66
.........................Farm Scope (Index of Diversi¯cation) .........................
Intercept ¡0:1042 0:0740 ¡1:41
Acres Operated 0:1247 0:0801 1:56
Coupled Payments 0:0003 0:0004 0:74
Direct Payments 0:0005 0:0005 1:03
All Other Payments ¡0:0004 0:0003 ¡1:34
Operator Hours ¡0:0029 0:0034 ¡0:85
Spouse Hours 0:0083 0:0046 1:80¤
County Diversi¯cation 0:0024 0:0851 0:03
Change in Total County Output ¡0:1284 0:0532 ¡2:41¤
County Share of Grains 0:1773 0:0721 2:46¤
County Share of Tobacco 0:1858 0:1041 1:78¤
County Share of Cotton ¡0:8426 0:1771 ¡4:76¤
County Share of Vegetables ¡0:0965 0:1502 ¡0:64
County Share of Fruit ¡0:7350 0:1987 ¡3:70¤
County Share of Nursery Products ¡0:2543 0:1210 ¡2:10¤
County Share of Poultry 0:0373 0:0833 0:45
County Share of Cattle ¡0:1575 0:0672 ¡2:34¤
County Share of Dairy 0:1737 0:0822 2:11¤
County Share of Hogs 0:4468 0:1110 4:02¤
¾ 0:3925 0:0067 58:55¤
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